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Abstract: Nationalism and differentiation are two of the hottest topics in the 
current European politics context. Based on the existing literature, this 
article seeks to establish what relationship exists between these two 
phenomena by analysing them from two perspectives: the political science 
one and the historical one. Thus, the paper discusses the evolution of the 
institutional structure of the modern state in Europe and shows how this 
institutional structure was transformed by the European integration process. 
The main conclusion arising from this paper is that the influence of 
nationalism in setting the institutional framework of the European states, is 
one of the key factors to explain the current configuration of European 
Union as a “system of integrated differentiation”. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper deals with the following question, what has been the 
influence of nationalism as a political phenomenon of contemporaneity in 
the configuration of the European Union as a “system of differentiated 
integration”? To achieve this, we use specialized literature and combine 
both a historical approach, which allows us to trace the origin and evolution 
of that influence, and a political science perspective that permits to evaluate 
and to understand the impact of this phenomenon on the birth of 
differentiation as a political reality of the European Union. The article 
reaches the conclusion that nationalism made modern states into political 
units, institutionally designed to preserve their autonomy and within which 
all discussions, proposals and realities are constrained by national 
perspective. A reality that has hindered the integration process and has made 
differentiation into a key feature to allow its advance. 
In the first chapter, we analyse the way in which nationalism shaped 
the institutional structure of the modern state and made it into a nation state. 
The second part examines the nation state’s evolution in Europe after 1945 
and the manner in which it was transformed in a member state by the 
process of European integration. The third part evaluates the cleavages 
which appeared within the Union as a result of the progressive integration of 
states with different characteristics and structurally designed to protect their 
autonomy and peculiarities. Lastly, the paper focuses on differentiation as 
one of the main features of the European Union and tries to establish the 
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historical linkage between nationalism and that specific characteristic of The 
European Union integration process. 
 
From the state to the nation-state 
 
 
The idea of the nation appeared in Europe connected with liberalism 
during the period of political revolutions that gave rise to the modern state, 
between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In those days, 
though it did not occupy a central position in political discourse, the concept 
of nation referred to all citizens whose collective sovereignty established 
them as a state which was their political expression. In this sense, ideas of 
participation and choice were key to this concept because, although they 
were not yet developed, they allowed to link the nation (all citizens) with 
the territory, at a time when the structure and the definition of states were 
essentially territorial. 
Thus, the modern state, which governed all the inhabitants of a 
territory bounded by clear boundaries and without intermediate systems of 
rulers or autonomous corporations, was obliged to consider the opinion of 
its citizens because of two fundamental reasons. On the one hand, because 
the new political systems developed during the revolutions gave voice to 
citizens -usually through different kinds of elected representatives. 
Furthermore, because it needed their consent and even their active 
participation more and more each time. Thereby, the state and citizens were 
progressively linked by ties of political representation. 
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Considering that all traditional legitimations of state authority were 
under constant challenge since 1789, this new situation raised two major 
political problems to states and ruling classes: loyalty to the state and the 
ruling system and the citizens’ identification with them. Classical liberalism, 
which emerged as the main form of government after the revolutions of the 
1830s, dodged the issue of political beliefs of citizens by restricting political 
rights to men who owned property and had been educated. However, during 
the last third of the nineteenth Century it became increasingly evident that 
the democratization, or at least the increasingly electoralization of politics, 
were unavoidable (Hobsbawm 1992, 83). 
Moreover, in the last decades of the nineteenth century it began to be 
obvious that in those places where men were allowed to participate in 
politics, it could no longer be taken for granted that they would be loyal to 
their rulers or the state. This exacerbated the need for both the state and the 
ruling classes to compete with other rivals for the allegiance of citizenship. 
Democracy forced the political parties to pay more attention to the masses 
to get their votes, and nationalism was a useful tool to achieve it. 
As a result, since 1880 nationalism jumped to the forefront of 
political debate at a time when the decline of the old socio-political ties had 
forced the state to develop new forms of civic loyalty. In this regard, the 
political appeal of national slogans for the masses of voters was a matter of 
very practical interest. Indeed, the question was interesting not only for 
governments faced with various kinds of agitation or national demands, but 
also for political parties that sought to mobilize the electorate based on 
national movements (Gellner 1997, 25-36). 
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Consequently, nationalism, which had been a phenomenon of the 
educated middle classes up until then, became a masses mobilizer (Zimmer 
2003, 27). The states took advantage of this new social phenomenon to 
build new loyalties which would enable them to obtain the support of a 
citizenry which had become larger. Thus, using feelings of collective 
belonging that already existed, states began to build collective identities that 
permitted them to build up human communities strongly connected with 
their territory. As a result, modern states and nations got closer. 
The nationalization of the masses required the penetration by the 
state in each area and place of national life (police, transportation, taxes, 
schools, etc.), and it was based on the extension of universal suffrage and 
the national press, as well as on the start-up of state cultural policies. 
However, this process was bidirectional since at the same time that the 
states advanced on their respective citizenries' nationalization, making them 
respond to national loyalties first, their institutional structures were also 
nationalized. Therefore, and this is a key element in our argument, all events 
and conflicts that occurred within national frameworks were determined, 
constrained and wrapped by nationalist rhetoric and national approaches 
(Zimmer 2003, 34). 
The time, when the democratization of politics made the link 
between state and nationalism essential, coincided with a situation in which 
nationalist feelings and racial superiority ideas began to be more easily 
mobilized as a result of the great migrations taking place in that period 
(1880-1914) and the growing international rivalries. In fact, from the 1880s 
on, nationalism joined Imperialism inextricably. This event, made 
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nationalism potentially aggressive and expansionist, specially owing to the 
fact that imperial expectations were usually too high to be accomplished. In 
this context, nationalism turned rightist and ethnicity as well as language 
became its main criteria (Anderson 2006, 83-11;141-154).  
Finally, nationalism became an explosive force during the interwar 
period as a consequence of strong political instability. At that time, 
nationalism also took control of the economy due to the fact that capitalism 
sought refuge from economic crisis in nation-state during the thirties. In 
Eric Hobsbawm’s words “what dominated inter-war nationalism in Europe, 
therefore, was the nationalism of established nation-states” (Hobsbawm 
1992, 143). 
 
From the nation-state to the member-state 
 
 
What happened to nationalism after 1945? According to Hobsbawm, 
if we take into account the role which was played by nationalism between 
1830 and 1945 we must conclude that it lost its importance as vector of 
historical change. However, that does not mean it disappeared from 
European political life (MarcadorDePosición2, 163,181). In this regard, 
Bickerton has pointed out that the nation-state did not undergo any 
transformation after the fascism’s defeat, as well as that change did not 
occur until the late seventies and especially the eighties (Bickerton 2012, 
13-14). Therefore, nation-states led the process of European integration 
during its first decades. 
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Since 1945, the acknowledgement of Keynesian consensus allowed 
European nation-states to preserve the two characteristic elements of 
nationalist policies that had shaped their institutional structures along the 
previous decades, the close relationship between state and society and the 
control of the economy. Regarding the former, after 1945 the actions of the 
European nation-state were fully subjected to a social contract that 
connected it with society through two functions: its role as mediator 
between the world of work and enterprise; and the redistribution of wealth 
through the welfare state. The second task made it intervene in the economy 
in order to stabilize the economic cycle. 
In light of above mentioned, the national ties remained strong in this 
period, so that political life remained firmly linked to the nation-state. This 
situation largely limited national governments to internationalize their 
actions, prompting a restricted integration of national frameworks, 
something which was reflected both in the foreign policy cooperation and in 
the economic integration process. Concerning the former, there was very 
little cooperation between Western Europe states. Regarding the latter, the 
failure of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) to function as a 
supranational route for industrial restructuring, highlighted the national 
governments’ constraints to transfer powers to a supranational entity 
(Bickerton 2012, 124,152). 
During the seventies, both the post-war Keynesian consensus and the 
corporatist nation-states articulated around it went into a deep crisis. At first, 
governments tried to strengthen the characteristics of that kind of state, but 
very soon all of them decided that the best solution lay in its transformation. 
 A Troublesome Historical Legacy 
 
52 
 
Thus, the answer to the crisis was sought in the denationalization of 
macroeconomic policies that had characterized European states since the 
end of World War II. 
In this way, the dismantling of the Keynesian consensus and its 
replacement by a set of fiscal and monetary policies, released from 
corporatist and interventionist post-war policies, allowed national 
executives to deepen into the European integration process, especially in 
economic terms. From then on, the European integration process, which had 
its decisive moments with the signing of the Single European Act in 1985 
and especially with the creation of the European Monetary Union in the 
nineties, played a key role in the transformation of European nation-states 
which, since then had to submit their macroeconomic policies to the 
European institutions. 
This transformation of the Keynesian nation-state through its 
integration into pan-European policy development processes gave rise to a 
new type of state that Bickerton has conceptualized as “member state” 
(Bickerton 2012). A new state model characterized by the breakdown of the 
two main pillars on which nationalism and the nation-state were supported: 
the close relationship between society and state and the control of the 
national economy. Consequently, the new member states’ foundations were 
a much narrower social contract between state and citizens. It consisted of a 
set of weaker political and social mediation institutions, with a clear 
weakening of the ones related to welfare state. In particular, executive 
power as well as national Administration became much more closely 
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connected with pan-European policymaking processes and with less 
capacity to control macroeconomic policy. 
Thus, when governments were released from the complex society-
state relationship, they manage to distance themselves from their domestic 
constituents and to become more dependent on supranational rules and 
regulations. In contrast to nation states, governments of member states base 
their power and identity in their membership in a group or wider 
community. However, what interests us here is that the transformation in 
member states did not substantially alter the institutional structure of nation-
states, since member states continued to be ruled by national governments, 
which had to respond to national parliaments elected by citizens, who kept 
on identifying themselves with their countries' territory, defined by borders, 
and whose main concerns were related to issues happening within those 
boundaries. 
 
State’s differences and cleavages 
 
 
The states that joined the European integration process did not only 
have different cultures and historical identities and were demographically 
asymmetrical, but also their citizens held different political points of view as 
well as heterogeneous interests (Fabbrini 2015). Despite this, the masses 
stayed in the sidelines of the integration process due to the fact that it was 
driven by each state's political elites, those elites were subject to 
institutional structures forged by nationalism. In other words, the states were 
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linked to their respective territories through the right to vote of the people 
who were born in them. In this way, native people could choose, at least 
formally, the government which would rule the state and change it if it did 
not meet their demands, which in the most of the cases were related to their 
own country. Thus, at the same time that the integration process progressed, 
structural divisions that reflected these differences started to appear and 
became established. 
According to professor Fabbrini, three cleavages related to different 
member state views on national sovereignty, on democratic legitimacy and 
on the proper relations that should be set up between member states have 
underpinned those divisions (Fabbrini 2015). The basic structural cleavage 
concerns the very interpretation of state sovereignty in a union of states. 
National sovereignty (and its correlated national identity) has (and have) 
continuously played a dividing role in Europe, first between those 
supporting a view of the union merely as an economic community and those 
accepting the project of an ever-closer Union, and thus, within the latter 
group, between supranational and intergovernmental views. This cleavage 
reflects the different historical experiences of the Continental Western 
Europe and the island and peninsular states of Northern Europe in the 
formation of the nation state and its international extensions.   
The UK has come to head a coalition of member states that view 
integration primarily as a process of strengthening a common market. These 
member states regarded the deepening of the integration process, which has 
taken place from the Maastricht treaty onwards, as a threat to their national 
sovereignty. This group was joined by some of the new East European 
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member states. The other side of the cleavage was represented by the large 
majority of Western European Continental member states whose historical 
experience was very different. In their case, nationalism was historically the 
force that erased democracy and so for them integration represents the 
antidote to the virus of authoritarian nationalism.  
The previous cleavage has been reinforced by another one regarding 
the democratic legitimacy of the Union. In light of this cleavage, democracy 
has been considered as a form of government that is viable only by 
remaining at the national level and as a political regime that should be 
adapted to new historical needs. The former position has been largely shared 
in the Northern islands and peninsula in Europe as well as in some of its 
Eastern member states. This position has stressed that legitimacy can be 
claimed only at the national level where it is implemented through domestic 
parliaments. For them, keeping the EU within the limits of an economic 
community would preserve the democratic role of national parliaments. The 
latter position has been backed up by the main continental member states. 
These countries support the idea of developing a federal state in order to 
keep national evils under control and deal with the challenges of the future. 
Nevertheless, there is a division within this group between those 
recognizing integration as a necessity, as for the intergovernmentalist, and 
those celebrating it as a virtue, as for supranationalists (Fabbrini 2015). 
The third structural cleavage represents the clash between the 
legitimate interests of small, medium and large member states. This 
cleavage, which has become more central as a consequence of the 
enlargements of the 1990s and the 2000s, has two sides. The institutional 
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one refers to the need of the small member states not to be overruled in the 
decision-making process and the request of the large member states to 
preserve a correlation with the democratic principle of “one person, one 
vote”. Although a compromise has been reached in this regard between 
large, medium and small member states, a union of asymmetrical states will 
have to recognize the territoriality of its units as a source of equal political 
subjectivity. The economical one is related to the fact that the large states 
are more developed and richer than the small ones. This situation has been 
restrained by a significant redistribution of resources from the larger and 
richer member states to the smaller and poorer ones. However, the euro 
crisis has reduced the resources available for policies of territorial 
redistribution, showing the economic dependence of the smaller member 
states on the larger ones. 
The lack of a formal constitution able to crystallize a common 
political will and to furnish a common normative language for framing both 
the deep divisions concerning the nature of the EU and the conflicts 
between the states, has made the structural cleavages an unresolved feature 
of the EU political system. For that reason, a Union has emerged constituted 
by member states and citizens with three different perspectives on what the 
EU is and should become. The perspective of the EU as an Economic 
Community, advanced by the defenders of national sovereignty, interested 
in protecting domestic democracy and in utilizing the Union as a means for 
creating and maintaining a common market. The perspective of the EU as an 
intergovernmental union, supported by those member states which claimed 
to pool their sovereignty on policies strategically important to them (such as 
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economic and foreign policies) at the European level of intergovernmental 
institutions. The perspective of the parliamentary union, backed up by those 
member states, who agreed to share their ultimate decision-making power 
on several policies regulating the functioning of the single market with 
Union actors politically connected to them, but also institutionally 
independent from them.  
 
Differentiation and European Integration 
 
 
The union of states structurally designed to protect their autonomy 
and to put national interests before any other, as well as the cleavages 
coming from that union, have turned differentiation across policy areas and 
spaces into one of the recurring phenomena of the process of European 
integration. However, while the examples of differentiation such as the opt-
outs from EMU, the transitional arrangements for new member states, or the 
association of a non-member countries, have been mainly seen as 
(temporary or marginal) side effects of negotiations on bargaining about 
more integration, Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig argue that 
differentiation is an essential and, most likely, enduring characteristic of the 
EU (Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2012). 
Accepting differentiation as an essential feature of EU makes it 
difficult to conceptualize it as a state or a federation (the classical polities’ 
conceptualization), since both its level of centralization and its territorial 
extension may vary by policy or task. In this sense, both conceptions ignore 
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the extent to which the EU has developed an institutional core or centre that 
reaches across the EU’s policy sectors with their variation in centralization 
and territorial scope. The EU is not “many Europes” with task-specific 
jurisdictions each having their own organization, but one Europe with a 
single organizational and member state core and a territorial extension that 
varies by function. This reality has been conceptualized as a “system of 
differentiated integration” by the above mentioned authors. 
According to these authors, a system of differentiated integration is 
characterized by vertical and horizontal differentiation. In determining 
differentiation, we must start from a ‘policy’ as a set of rules and procedures 
governing an issue-area. Each policy has a certain level of centralization (or 
vertical integration) and territorial extension (or horizontal integration). 
Thus, the variance in vertical integration across policies constitutes the 
degree of vertical differentiation in the system. In addition, we can 
determine the horizontal integration in each policy area by counting the 
number of participating states. The variance in horizontal integration across 
policies constitutes the extent of horizontal differentiation in the system. On 
the other hand, it is possible to distinguish different kinds of horizontal 
differentiation in the EU. A policy area is characterized by internal 
differentiation if at least one member state does not participate in integration 
and by external differentiation if at least one no-member state participates. 
Furthermore, internal and external differentiation can go together if a policy 
combines both members and no members of EU. 
From a historical perspective, whereas vertical differentiation has 
always exceed horizontal differentiation in European integration but has 
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nonetheless remained more or less stable, the latter has grown over the past 
30 years. In this regard, it seems that horizontal differentiation has been the 
price of dynamic growth in both vertical and horizontal integration. Thus, 
European Community was a highly decentralized but uniform federal polity 
from 1950s to the late 1980s; by contrast, since then, the EU has developed 
into a system of differentiated integration combining vertical with horizontal 
differentiation. Moreover, the strong growth in both vertical and horizontal 
integration has not reduced either vertical or horizontal differentiation.  
To provide a suitable explanation for this transformation into a 
system of differentiated integration, it is essential to keep in mind the 
survival of the institutional structure of the states forged by the nationalism, 
which we have already mentioned. Nevertheless, before addressing this 
account, it is necessary to consider four elements. First of all, the key role 
played by national governments in a process based on the signing of 
international treaties which transfer formal competences from states to an 
international organization. Secondly, the interdependence which arises 
between states taking part in the integration process as a result of 
multilateral cooperation established between them as a consequence of the 
signing of treaties. In the third place, the convergence of preferences. That 
is, the existence of common interests between all states involved in the 
integration process. And eventually, politization. In other words, the refusal 
of states to continue advancing the integration process when this requires 
the transfer of competences involving the loss of state autonomy (Leuffen, 
Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2012). 
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As it is known, the early European integration process began with 
market integration under very conductive conditions owing to several 
reasons. On the one hand, trade is an area of high transnational exchange 
and international interdependence. On the other hand, it is a field of low 
autonomy and identity costs for states since by integrating the market, 
governments lose relatively little autonomy. Furthermore, markets do not 
qualify as strong symbols of national identity. Finally, the founding 
members of the EEC were similar in terms of their economic structure and 
wealth, a similarity which facilitated the preference for convergence.  
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty and EU enlargement with the 
entry of Eastern countries, which reinforced the sovereigntist group, shifted 
the previous dynamic. At that moment, the initial integration outcome had 
created spillover institutionalization effects, which generated additional 
interdependence, calling for more integration and producing the expansion 
of integration to new policy areas, new countries, and higher level of 
centralization. The supranational integration of core areas of the state’s 
power such us monetary policy and policies of border control, immigration, 
internal security and defence which had traditionally been exclusive 
domains of the state, and where transnational exchanges and interaction was 
more limited than in trade, threatened the autonomy of states which had 
been institutionally designed to preserved it and triggered politization. This 
shifted the locus of integration negotiations from the international to the 
domestic level, and as a consequence transformed them into domestically 
embedded and constrained. Under these circumstances, integration either 
stagnates, or further integration is accompanied by further differentiation 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The main conclusion of this paper is that the influence of 
nationalism in the setting of the institutional framework of the European 
states is a key element to explain the appearance of the differentiation in the 
current European political reality and, therefore, in the shaping of the EU as 
a “system of differentiated integration”. In this regard, although the process 
of European integration has transformed the state model which was forged 
by nationalism, it has not removed the mechanisms inherited from 
nationalism that make them work as independent political units and jealous 
guardians of their autonomy. In our view, these inherited institutional 
structures are ideal vehicles for channelling the resurgence of nationalism as 
a political phenomenon that is occurring in Europe at the moment. 
Consequently, we consider that unless current political conditions change, 
differentiation will be increasing within the European Union in the near 
future. 
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